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HIGH COURT CUTS CASES
Conservative Tide a Factor
USA Today
Tuesday, February 20, 1996
Tony Mauro
The Supreme Court appears to be doing its part to reduce the role of government.
The nation's highest court, which returns to the bench today, is on course to end its term
in June with the fewest number of decisions in 42 years.
The court, which has stopped accepting cases this term, will issue at most 77 opinions.
Ten years ago the court issued 145 decisions.
"At this rate, they'll be out of business by the year 2049," joked Northwestern
University law professor Dan Polsby.
The court used to schedule four oral arguments a day; now, most days, it hears only two
cases and is done by noon.
"Guidance from the court is going to be less than we've had in a generation," said
University of Pittsburgh law professor Arthur Hellman.
But University of Virginia professor David O'Brien said the court isn't shirking its duty.
"They're still dealing with very major issues."
The Supreme Court hasn't given a reason for the decline.
Some believe the conservative court sees fewer decisions it wants to reverse.
Today, 12 of the 13 federal appeals courts are dominated by Reagan-Bush appointees.
Justice Byron White's retirement in 1993 may be a factor, too. He was an advocate for
taking more cases and resolving all conflicts between lower federal courts.
Now some minor conflicts may go unresolved.
Or like factory managers slowing down an assembly line, the justices may want to do
a better job on fewer cases.
"It's clearly a conscious, institutional decision that the quality of their work was
suffering," said lawyer David Stewart, who worked as a clerk at the court during its high
output years.
"They looked around and said, 'This isn't working."'
USA Today Copyright 1996
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THE SHRINKING DOCKET
Attorneys Try to Make an Issue out of the Dramatic Decline In High Court
Rulings
The Washington Post
Monday, March 18, 1996
Joan Biskupic
Lawyers who want the Supreme Court to hear
a particular case.usually tell.the justices how
important the issue is or how much lower courts
need their guidance. Now comes a new rationale:
The justices have nothing else to do.
Nothing else to do?
The steady drop in the court's caseload has
come to this: Lawyers trying to get the court to
review a difficult business case have argued for
what appears to be the first time that their case
should be heard partly because the justices simply
have the time.
"We are not here arguing that the court's
relatively lighter work load justifies granting a
petition that does not otherwise warrant the court's
review," said the amicus curiae filing by General
Motors Corp., written by lawyer Paul Cappuccio.
"Rather, our point is that the clear absence of a
crushing workload for the next term eliminates any
need to pass over a petition... that raises important
and recurring issues of constitutional law."
Cappuccio, who clerked for Justices Antonin
Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy back in the flush
1980s, reminds the court of the numbers: In the
1985-86 term, 171 cases were argued before the
court. In this 1995-96 term, the number will be
about half that.
The court's argument calendar and the number
of signed rulings have continued to drop since the
1980s. Last term the court issued only 82 decisions,
and this year it is expected to issue 74 (some of the
cases argued are combined for purposes of a ruling).
This compares with the early 1980s, when the court
handed down about 150 rulings a term, and the late
1980s, when it issued 130 a term.
The inportance of the court, of course, is not in
its numbers. It is in the court having the last word.
The justices are the final arbiter of what is in the
Constitution.
Just one Supreme Court ruling can tear apart
the nation, whether it be by perpetuating slavery (in
1857), striking down New Deal programs (in the
1930s), ordering school desegregation (in 1954) or
legalizing abortion nationwide (1973). And with the
cases this term alone, the court could change the
legal landscape for gay rights, black-majority voting
districts and male-only military schools.
Still, the drop in cases has been so dramatic that
it demands attention.
"Theyre engaging in their own mini-shutdown
of the government," said Kenneth S. Geller, a former
deputy U.S. solicitor general who still specializes in
appellate work.
"It is important in a system of checks and
balances that the court be perceived by the public as
a force comparable to the force of Congress and to
the executive branch," added Bruce Ennis, a
prominent member of the Supreme Court bar. "If the
court reduces its workload to the point where its
decisions rarely impact the lives of individuals or the
activities of business, the court risks losing the
institutional credibility it may need when a true
conflict between the [branches] emerges." Ennis
does not think the court has reached that point.
There is no single theory from anyone, including
the justices, about why the court is accepting fewer
cases. And whether the consequences for the country
are good or bad is in dispute, too, given that the
rulings - not the numbers -- are what matters. In
some disputes over social policy, for example,
liberals would be happy not to have this
conservative court intervene.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has
attributed the drop from 150 cases heard in the early
1980s to about 130 by the end of the decade to 1988
legislation lifting virtually all mandates that the
court hear certain cases. The justices now have
nearly complete discretion over their docket.
Rehnquist has speculated that the decrease
continued because the lower federal courts now are
generally in sync with the high court. A majority of
the lower court judges also are Ronald Reagan and
George Bush appointees.
For his part, the chiefjustice, who has been on
the bench for 25 years, has said he no longer votes
to take a case just because it is "interesting." Rather,
Rehnquist is more inclined to let an issue
"percolate" and let other lower courts examine the
matter before the high court weighs in.
Four votes are needed to grant a petition and
schedule oral arguments. Five votes are needed to
win a case. With the court narrowly divided on many
social issues, some justices who do not agree with a
lower-court ruling may not vote to hear an appeal
because of the risk that five justices may affirm the
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lower-court decision and impose it as a national
rule.
Other justices refer to the shrinking docket,
mostly to assert that they are not lazy. Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, for instance, has observed
that the justices still must pour through hundreds
and hundreds of requests for review. Indeed, while
the justices have become more selective in recent
years, petitions have been steadily climbing to about
7,000 a term.
Recent high-profile -cases -turned -down --
without comment or explanation, as is the rule --
include one testing whether automakers can be sued
for failing to install air bags before federal law
required it; another testing the constitutionality of a
federal ban on sexually frank broadcasts; and
another on the liability of a mother who refused to
seek proper medical care for her dying son because
of religious beliefs.
Some lawyers complain that the lack of high
court review can lead to legal uncertainty and
inefficiency and forum shopping -- that is, a quest
by complainants to find the jurisdiction where the
law will be interpreted most favorably.
Justice Byron R. White, who retired in 1993,
believed the court had a responsibility to resolve
conflicts between the regional circuit courts as
quickly as possible. White regularly dissented from
denial of review, asserting that the court's refusal to
hear certain cases leads to federal law being carried
out in different ways in different parts of the
country. Since his departure, no justice has voiced
similar concerns.
"If you're a national business and an important
legal rule is being interpreted one way in the South
and one way in New England, you have a hard time
figuring out what to do, " said John Roberts, another
former deputy solicitor general who often argues at
the court. "It can lead to a Balkanization of the
national economy at a time when the drive is to be
more international."
Roberts, who is a former law clerk to Rehnquist,
adds that the court may be more tentative about
which disputes to take on because it has newer and
comparatively younger members than in the 1980s.
Chief Justice Relnquist, who is hardly tentative,
once said that if he were embarrassed by the court's
drop in cases, he would simply vote to take more.
That was almost two years ago -- when the court
was handling about 10 more cases than it is now.
The Washington Post Copyright 1996
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LEGACY OF A TERM - A SPECIAL REPORT
In Supreme Court's Decisions, A Clear Voice, And A Murmur
The New York Times
July 3, 1996
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON: The Supreme Court brought a
long and difficult term to an end on Monday,
leaving behind rulings rich in symbolic significance
for women and homosexuals while at the same time
providing abundant evidence of the extent to which
the Court's discourse has shifted to the right.
This was a term with not one theme, but many.
The Court spoke sometimes with surprising clarity,
as in the 7-to-I decision that invalidated the
men-only admissions policy at the Virginia Military
Institute. But it sometimes spoke in multiple voices
so muddled as to be barely comprehensible, as in the
six separate opinions that roamed over the First
Amendment landscape in an inconclusive effort to
decide whether the Government can regulate
indecent programming.
The Court displayed a deep mistrust of
Govemment efforts to classify people -- whether by
race, for the purpose of drawing district lines, as
shown in two decisions that invalidated
majority-black Congressional districts, or by sexual
preference, as seen in the 6-to-3 ruling that struck
down a Colorado provision that barred the adoption
of state or local laws to protect homosexuals.
But in a series of criminal-law decisions, the
Court showed substantial deference to Government
law-enforcement policies. Most notably, the Court
shifted course after several years of questioning the
Government's aggressive use of its forfeiture
authority. The Justices overturned rulings by two
lower courts who said forfeitures of convicted drug
dealers' assets violated the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy.
The Court also turned back a challenge to the
Federal Government's priorities in crack-cocaine
prosecutions, rejecting a lower court's conclusion
that statistics showing most defendants were black
were so suggestive of selective prosecution as to
require the Government to explain itself.
On such central questions as race and
Federalism, the term's end brought not closure, but
only a temporary interruption of ongoing
conversations within the Court. Dealing with its
third set of redistricting cases in four years, and with
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor retaining her
equivocal role at the center of the debate over the
meaning of the equal-protection guarantee, the
Court has not yet settled clearly on a standard for
evaluating the use of race in drawing district lines.
The Court has already accepted new voting-rights
cases for its next term, indicating that this debate
will continue.
The debate will also continue over state
prerogatives within the Federal system, a question
on which the Court is also sharply divided. In a
landmark decision interpreting state immunity under
the 11th Amendment, the Court ruled that Congress
lacked the authority to exercise its jurisdiction over
interstate commerce in a way that made states liable
to lawsuits in Federal Courts.
While the full implications of that 5-to-4 ruling
may not be apparent for years, the Justices have a
number of new cases on their docket for the next
term that will further explore the line between
Federal and state authority. The most prominent of
these is an appeal challenging the Brady
handgun-control law on the ground that Congress
cannot constitutionally require local sheriffs to
conduct background checks of prospective handgun
buyers.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has led the
Court in its re-examination of long-settled principles
of Federalism. Completing his 10th year as Chief
Justice, he stamped his vision on the term in many
ways. He wrote not only the 11th Amendment
decision, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, but also a
number of the most important rulings in the
criminal-law area as well.
The lopsided majorities in favor of the
Government in criminal cases - as always, the
single biggest category on the Court's docket - were
a striking reminder of how much the Court has
changed since the retirement in the early 1990's of
Justices William J. Brennan Jr. and Thurgood
Marshall.
The decisions in the forfeiture and
selective-prosecution cases produced solitary
dissents by Justice John Paul Stevens, but other
decisions, including one that validated the use of
routine traffic stops by the police as pretexts for
drug investigations, were unanimous. A set of
arguments that would have had to have been
accounted for by the majority in the past, although
they would probably not have prevailed, were
simply absent from the Court's consideration of
these cases.
Along with Justice Stevens and Justice David H.
Souter, President Clinton's two appointees, Justices
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, form
what can be described as the liberal wing of the
Court, but the term is relative and the four do not
always vote as a bloc. For example, Justice
Ginsburg left the other three behind when she joined
the majority in a forfeiture case that permitted the
State of Michigan to seize a car that a man had used
while soliciting a prostitute. The wife argued that
because she was an "innocent owner," she should
not have to lose her interest in the car.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas
and Chief Justice Rehnquist are the Court's
predictable conservatives, although the Chief Justice
joined Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in the
V.M.I. case over Justice Scalia's impassioned
dissent.
As has been true for the last several years, the
Court's center of gravity is occupied by two
moderate conservatives, Justices O'Connor and
Anthony M. Kennedy, as the term's statistics show.
They dissented the least of any Justices, only five
times for Justice Kennedy and six for Justice
O'Connor. Justice Stevens cast 19 dissenting votes
in the 75 cases the Court decided. With 34 of those
cases, or 45 percent, having been decided by 9-to-O
votes, Justice Stevens dissented in nearly half of the
contested cases.
Where Justices Kennedy and O'Connor were,
the Court was. Of the dozen cases decided by 5-to-4
votes, they were each in the majority nine times,
more than any other Justices.
The extent to which Justice Scalia was
marginalized this term was notable. His vote
counted in close cases, of course, but his most
prominent role was as the author of vitriolic dissents
that appeared more likely to offend than to
persuade. He said the Court's 7-to-2 decision that
public contractors have First Amendment rights
protecting them against patronage dismissal was
"astonishing," adding: "The Court must be living in
another world. Day by day, case by case, it is busy
designing a Constitution for a country I do not
recognize."
The term, which began Oct. 2 and ended July 1,
was the longest in seven years. The 75 decisions,
barely half the number the Court was issuing in the
early 1980's, made this the lightest term since
1953-54, Earl Warren's first term as Chief Justice.
Next year's schedule is likely to be heavier; the
Court has already selected four dozen cases for
decisions in the term that begins Oct. 7.
Below are summaries of the term's major
rulings:
DISCRIMINATION: A WIDE RANGE OF BIAS
CASES
The Supreme Court struck down a Colorado
state constitutional amendment that nullified
existing civil rights protections for homosexuals and
barred the passage of any new laws protecting them
at the state or local level. "A state cannot so deem a
class of persons a stranger to its laws," Justice
Kennedy said in a forceful opinion based on the 14th
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined in
Justice Scalia's equally forceful dissent, which
accused the 6-to-3 majority of taking sides in "the
culture wars" through "an act not of judicial
judgment but of political will."
The decision, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039,
left many questions unanswered about the scope of
gay rights; the majority avoided any reference to the
Court's ruling 10 years ago that the constitutional
right to privacy does not extend to sex between
consenting homosexual adults. But the Court's tone
indicated that the earlier decision, Bowers v.
Hardwick, might soon be a dead letter --
functionally, if not through being formally
overruled.
In its most important sex-discrimination case in
years, the Court ruled 7 to I that the men-only
admissions policy at V.M.I., a state-supported
college, was unconstitutional and that the alternative
program the state had devised for women was an
inadequate substitute for admitting women to the
military college, which is 157 years old. The Court
applied a searching standard that Justice Ginsburg
called "skeptical scrutiny" in deciding the case.
Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion,
which got six votes, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
concurred in a separate opinion. Justice Scalia
dissented. Justice Thomas's son attends V.M.I., so
he did not participate in the case, United States v.
Virginia, No. 94-194 1.
These two cases overshadowed the Court's other
decisions in cases dealing with discrimination, but
there were other important developments. In a pair
of redistricting cases, a 5-to-4 majority made it clear
that it meant what it had been saying about the
illegitimacy of using race as a dominant factor in
drawing district lines.
The Court declared unconstitutional four
Congressional districts that legislators had drawn in
Texas and North Carolina after the 1990 census to
give minority voters more electoral influence. The
outcome was less than crystal clear, however;
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in the Texas
case, Bush v. Vera, No. 94-805, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Kennedy, appeared to leave some
room for considering race among other factors; the
concurring opinion by Justices Scalia and Thomas
emphatically ruled it out. Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote for the majority in the North Carolina case,
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Shaw v. Hunt, No. 94-923. With new voting rights
cases already on the docket for the next term, the
Court is evidently prepared to keep trying to clarify
this difficult area.
A unanimous statutory decision strengthened
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967. The Court held that a lawsuit for age
discrimination can succeed even if the worker
bringing the suit has been replaced by someone
older than age 40, the age at which the law's
protections begin to apply. Justice Scalia's opinion,
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers, No.
95-354, rejected a lower court's analysis that said it
could not be age discrimination to be replaced by
someone else who is within the law's "protected
class."
CRIMINAL LAW: SEVERAL VICTORIES FOR
THE GOVERNMENT
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld
provisions of a new Federal law setting strict limits
on the ability of Federal courts to hear appeals from
state prison inmates who have previously filed at
least one habeas corpus petition, challenging the
constitutionality of their conviction or sentence. In
an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court
found that because Congress had not closed off the
Supreme Court's own jurisdiction to hear such
cases, the statute avoided the constitutional
problems that a complete denial of Federal court
review might have posed. The case was Felker v.
Turpin, No. 95-8836.
As usual, the Federal Government's policies on
narcotics prosecutions produced important rulings.
Most significantly, the Court ruled 8 to 1 that it did
not violate the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy for the Government to use both the
criminal law to prosecute someone and the law of
civil forfeiture to seize the defendant's property.
This double-barreled strategy, a cornerstone of
the Government's war on drugs, does not amount to
an impermissible double punishment for a single
offense, Chief Justice Rehnquist said in the majority
opinion, because civil forfeiture is not a punishment.
The decision, United States v. Ursery, No. 95-345,
cut back substantially on recent Supreme Court
decisions that had placed constitutional constraints
on the Government's use of civil-forfeiture
proceedings. Justice Stevens dissented.
The Government also won a second forfeiture
case. The Court ruled 5 to 4 that there was no
constitutional barrier against the Government
seizing property that was used to commit a crime,
even the property of an "innocent owner" who had
no connection with the criminal activity. The
decision, by Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected a
claim to compensation by a Michigan woman whose
half-interest in the family car was forfeited under a
state nuisance statute after her husband used it to
solicit a prostitute. Justices Ginsburg, O'Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas joined the opinion, Bennis v.
Michigan, No. 94-8729.
The Court held that statistics showing that the
overwhelming number of Federal crack-cocaine
defendants are black were not sufficient to support
a defense argument that the Government is engaged
in selective prosecution.
The 8-to-1 decision, with a majority opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and a dissent by Justice
Stevens, overturned a Federal appeals court's ruling
that the statistical disparity was troubling enough to
require the Government to explain itself in pretrial
discovery, as sought by five black defendants. Some
90 percent of those convicted of Federal crimes
involving crack are black; for crimes with powdered
cocaine, which carry much lighter sentences, about
30 percent of the defendants are black.
To get discovery, Chief Justice Rehnquist said,
the defendants first had to show there were
"similarly situated" whites whom the Government
could have prosecuted on crack-cocaine charges.
The case was United States v. Armstrong, No.
95-157.
The Court ruled unanimously that even if the
police used a minor traffic infraction as a pretext to
stop a car and look for drugs, the detention was still
valid because an officer's motive was irrelevant. As
long as a reasonable officer could have stopped the
car under the circumstances, the stop meets the
Fourth Amendments reasonableness requirement,
Justice Scalia said for the Court in Whren v. United
States, No. 95-5841.
The Justices came down unanimously on the
side of judicial discretion in applying the Federal
sentencing guidelines, ruling that a Federal district
judge had been justified in giving sentences lower
than those provided by the guidelines to the two Los
Angeles police officers convicted of Federal
offenses in the beating of Rodney G. King. Justice
Kennedy wrote the decision, Koon v. United States,
No. 94-1664.
The Court ruled that a Federal law requiring a
mandatory five-year sentence for anyone who "uses
or carries a firearm" while committing a drug
offense applied only if the gun was used in an active
fashion to injure or threaten someone. Justice
O'Connor's wrote the unanimous opinion, Bailey v.
United States, No. 94-7448, rejecting the
Governments argument that even a gun that is kept
out of sight can embolden a drug dealer and thus
come under the statute.
The Court ruled 5 to 4 that defendants who are
prosecuted in a single case for more than one petty
offense did not have a constitutional right to a jury
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trial. The Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial
extends only to prosecutions for serious offenses,
those carrying sentences of more than six months,
the Court has long held. In this case, Lewis v.
United States, No. 95-6465, the Court said that a
petty offense did not become a serious offense
simply because several such charges had been
combined, raising the possibility of a combined
sentence of more than six months. Justice O'Connor
wrote the majority opinion; Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Kennedy and Stevens dissented.
Establishing a new rule of evidence that applies
to both the Federal criminal and civil courts, the
Court created an evidentiary privilege permitting
psychotherapists and other mental health
professionals to refuse to disclose patient records injudicial proceedings. The privilege brings the
Federal courts into line with the prevailing approach
in the states. Justice Stevens wrote the decision,
Jaffee v. Redmond, No. 95-266, for a 7-to-2
majority, with Justice Scalia dissenting; Chief
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Court's
specific holding, which applied the privilege to
testimony by a clinical social worker.
SPEECH: POLITICS, ADS AND INDECENCY
In an important case about political speech, the
Supreme Court ruled that political parties could not
be limited in the amount of money they spend on
behalf of their candidates as long as the
expenditures are "independent" and not coordinated
with the candidate. Justice Breyer's plurality
opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter,
held open the possibility that in a future case, the
Court would find that parties have a First
Amendment right to make coordinated expenditures
as well.
Four other Justices -- Justices Kennedy, Scalia
and Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist - would
have gone further and permitted coordinated
expenditures. The two dissenters, Justices Ginsburg
and Stevens, said the limits on party spending
imposed by the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1974 were constitutional.
An even more splintered Court tried to assess,
in light of the First Amendment, the Government's
interest in shielding children from indecent
programming on cable television. With Justice
Breyer writing, sometimes for a majority and
sometimes for only a plurality, the Court reviewed
a 1992 Federal law. It struck down a section
permitting cable television systems to ban indecent
programming from channels made available to
community groups, while upholding a provision
permitting cable systems to ban the programs from
channels leased for a fee to commercial
programmers.
A 6-to-3 majority struck down a third section of
the law that required cable systems choosing to
offer indecent programming to scramble the signal
reaching any subscriber who had not made a written
request to receive the indecent material. Justices
Ginsburg and Kennedy would have invalidated all of
the three-part law. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas would have upheld all of
it. The case was Denver Area Consortium v.
Federal Communications Commission, No.
95-124.
A pair of decisions greatly strengthened the
First Amendment protections afforded independent
government contractors to keep them from losing
their contracts in retaliation for criticizing
government or backing the wrong candidate in an
election. Voting 7 to 2, the Court extended to
outside contractors the constitutional protection
already available to government employees. Justice
O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in Board of
County Commissioners v. Umbehr, No. 94-1654,
and Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority in
O'Hare Truck Service v. City of Northlake, No.
95-191. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented in
both decisions.
Strengthening free-speech protection for
advertisers, the Court struck down a ban by the state
of Rhode Island on advertising liquor prices. The
decision, 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, No.
94-1140, cast constitutional doubt on the Clinton
Administration's proposed restrictions on cigarette
promotions. All nine Justices agreed with the result,
but there was no majority opinion, reflecting
divisions within the Court over how to analyze
commercial speech.
FEDERAL AUTHORITY: DEFINING RIGHTS
OF THE STATES
Continuing a searching, and divisive,
re-examination of the allocation of Federal and state
power that it began the previous year, the Supreme
Court sharply curbed the authority of Congress to
subject states to lawsuits in Federal courts.
The 5-to-4 decision invalidated a portion of a
1988 Federal law on procedures for setting up
gambling casinos on Indian reservations; it was
based on the 11th Amendment, which grants states
a measure of immunity from suits in Federal courts.
The Court overruled an earlier decision by which
Congress, in the exercise of its power to regulate
interstate commerce, could authorize suits against
states as part of Federal regulatory programs. The
new ruling, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, No. 94-12,
held unconstitutional a provision of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 that permitted
Indian tribes to sue states to bring them to the
bargaining table over terms for opening casinos.
7
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
Scalia and Thomas.
The Court was unanimous in ruling that the
Census Bureau was under no constitutional
obligation to adjust the results of the 1990 census to
correct an acknowledged undercount in big cities
and among minorities. New York and a coalition of
other big cities had sued to force the statistical
adjustment. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the
opinion, Wisconsin v.New York, No. 94-1614.
In an important product-liability case, the Court
ruled that consumers injured by faulty medical
devices, like cardiac pacemakers, could seek
damages under state law against the manufacturers
even if the devices comply with Federal regulations.
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, all nine Justices
rejected the broad claims of Federal pre-emption put
forward by the manufacturer, but the Court was
divided, 5 to 4, in some sections of the opinion,
Medtronic v. Lohr, No. 95-754.
WORKPLACE: PENSION ISSUES AND LABOR
LAW
An unusual number of decisions this term dealt
with issues in the workplace. The Supreme Court
ruled 6 to 3 that workers whose employers trick
them into giving up their benefits could sue to have
the coverage restored. The decision, written by
Justice Breyer, gave new teeth to the Federal law
that protects employee pensions and other
job-related benefits, which some lower courts had
interpreted as permitting only suits filed on behalf
of the benefit plan rather than, as in this case, suits
filed by employees on their own behalf. Justices
O'Connor, Thomas and Scalia cast the dissenting
votes in the case, Varity Corporation v. Howe, No.
94-1471.
A second case interpreting the same law, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
called ERISA, resulted in a victory for the employer.
The Court ruled that management could require
employees to give up various legal claims as the
price for getting an early-retirement buyout with
enhanced pension benefits. Justice Thomas wrote
the opinion, which was unanimous with respect to
the company's position, although not on a subsidiary
question in the case, Lockheed v. Spink, No.
95-809.
The Court ruled unanimously that paid union
organizers who take jobs in nonunion companies
with the goal of persuading co-workers to join the
union were entitled to the full protection of Federal
labor law. Justice Breyer wrote the opinion,
National Labor Relations Board v. Town and
Country Electric, No. 94-947.
Clarifying the relationship between labor and
antitrust law, the Court ruled that it was not an
antitrust violation for employers within an industry
to decide jointly to impose new contract terms on
their unionized employees after the breakdown of
labor negotiations. The 8-to-I decision was a victory
for the National Football League in a dispute over
salary caps for rookie players. Justice Breyer wrote
the decision, Brown v. Pro Football Inc., No.
95-388; Justice Stevens dissented.
-BUSINESS, BANKING: SAVINGS AND LOANS
COULD GET BILLIONS
In a case growing out of the savings and loan
crisis of the 1980's, the Supreme Court ruled 7 to 2
that the Government had breached its contracts with
three savings and loans and was liable for damages
to them because of the losses they had incurred
under a 1989 Federal law. The cost to the
Government of the ruling in the case, United States
v. Winstar, No. 95-865, could be in the billions.
Justice Souter wrote a plurality opinion. The Chief
Justice and Justice Ginsburg dissented.
In another case, the Court overturned a punitive
damage award, ruling that the $2 million an
Alabama jury gave to a man whose new BMW had
undisclosed paint damage was so "grossly
excessive" as to violate due process. The 5-to-4
decision, the latest in a long effort by the Court to
define the constitutional contours of punitive
damages, left much to be decided in future rulings.
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, BMW.
Gore, No. 94-896, joined by Justices Breyer,
Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter.
In a shareholder dispute, the Court ruled that
state courts could approve global settlements in
class-action cases, even when those cases involved
issues of Federal securities law that were beyond the
jurisdiction of the states. Justice Thomas wrote the
majority opinion, Matsushita v. Epstein, No.
94-1809, with Justices Ginsburg, Souter and
Stevens filing partial dissents.
In two cases, the Court gave unanimous
approval to the Comptroller of the Currency's broad
view of the powers of national banks. The Court
ruled that banks could sell insurance from branch
offices in small towns, despite any state laws to the
contrary. Justice Breyer wrote that opinion, Barnett
Bank v. Nelson, No. 94-1837. In the second case,
the Court held that national banks with interstate
credit card operations could charge their customers
throughout the country any late-payment fee
permitted by their home states. Justice Scalia wrote
that opinion, Smiley v. Citicorp, No. 95-860.
Copyright 1996 The New York Times Company
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A "PATH-BREAKING" TERM?
Decisions Make Court an Issue in Presidential Election
The Courier-Journal Louisville, KY
Sunday, July 7, 1996
Lyle Denniston (Baltimore Sun)
The Supreme Court has left town for the
summer after looking into what the constitutional
future might hold, and deciding to turn some of it
into reality now.
The term that ended last Monday was marked
by the lowest output of rulings in 42 years, but also
by two "path-breaking opinions" - in the words of
Justice Antonin Scalia, who did not like either of
them - that suggested new law in the making.
Those rulings - one on gay rights, the other on
women's rights - started the Court down a path
toward limited protection for homosexuals, and
perhaps considerably more assurance of equality of
the sexes. Each is likely to produce sequels, testing
how far the Supreme Court meant to go.
Whether those decisions foretold the future,
however, could depend on who is elected president
Nov. 5. The occupant of the White House over the
next four years may be able to select up to three new
justices, and no one doubts that a re-elected
President Clinton would choose more liberal justices
than would a newly elected President Dole.
None of the current justices is known to have
made definite plans to retire. But there is active
speculation among lawyers and academics who
watch the Supreme Court closely that there will be
retirements fairly soon, perhaps beginning after one
more term.
The names figuring in that speculation primarily
are Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, who will be
72 on the eve of the Supreme Court's new term in
October, and Justice John Paul Stevens, who is 76.
To a lesser degree, there has been speculation about
the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who
is 66.
As a result, activist groups are seeking to make
a campaign issue out of the Supreme Court's future.
Elliot Mincberg, legal director of the liberal
People for the American Way, said last week: "This
term emphasizes that the November elections are
crucial to the future composition of the Court. The
number of close decisions and the critical role
played by Justices O'Connor and (Anthony M.)
Kennedy show that a new justice or two could tip
the ideological balance."
Ralph Reed, executive director of the
conservative Christian Coalition, thinks so, too.
Last month on a Public Broadcasting System
program, he praised Bob Dole's promise to appoint
justices who "are not going to legislate a liberal
agenda from the bench." By contrast, Reed said, a
re-elected Clinton would "probably appoint at least
two, maybe three Supreme Court justices" who
would not satisfy conservative Christians.
The Supreme Court's balance of ideologies is
close: Neither the more conservative justices nor the
more liberal ones could produce a majority in 5-4
rulings without attracting "centrist" justices' support
- meaning O'Connor or Kennedy.
Thomas C. Goldstein, a law lecturer at
American University, noted in his annual
compilation of term data: "No 5-4 majority came
together this year without one or both of them." He
noted that the Supreme Court split 5-4 in 16 rulings
and that, while those decisions brought eight
different combinations of justices together in a
majority, one or both of the centrist justices joined
in every one.
"While Justice O'Connor has been the Court's
key swing vote for several terms," he said, "this year
we saw Justice Kennedy continue his move to the
Court's center."
By contrast, Goldstein said, the Supreme
Court's most liberal and most conservative members
have been left to dissent, largely in isolation.
Stevens, perhaps the most liberal, dissented alone
five times, and the two most conservative, Justices
Scalia and Clarence Thomas, each filed solitary
dissents twice; no other justice dissented alone.
He also noted that O'Connor and Kennedy
helped bolster the majorities in the two most visible
landmark rulings. They were part of a 6-3 majority
that struck down a Colorado state constitutional
amendment that barred legal protection for
homosexuals. They also joined a 7-1 majority that
nullified the decades-long tradition of excluding
women from the Virginia Military Institute.
Liberal observers took some comfort from those
margins. The American Civil Liberties Union's legal
director, Steven R Shapiro, said: "The fact that both
these cases were won with solid majorities
represents one of the most significant developments
in equal protection law in many years." The term,
he said, would "likely be most remembered" for
those two decisions.
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But Shapiro also lamented that the just-ended
term showed the Supreme Court growing more
skeptical of using race as a deciding factor in
drawing up voting districts, continuing a trend that
began in 1993.
He also complained that the Supreme Court
took a stricter approach to drug crimes, upholding
broad government powers to seize property related
to drug offenses, and showing little interest in
arguments that drug laws are enforced in a
discriminatory way against black suspects.
Scalia, one of the Supreme Court's most
conservative members and a strong internal critic of
what he takes to be its current trend, warned last
week that "the people should not be deceived" by
the majority's assurances in the gay rights and
women's rights cases that the majority was taking
merely limited new steps.
Scalia remarked bitterly in one of his final
dissents: "While the present Court sits, a major,
undemocratic restructuring of our national
institutions and mores is constantly in progress.
Day-by-day, case-by-case, (the Court) is busy
designing a Constitution for a country I do not
recognize."
If Scalia is right, and the Supreme Court has
grown more activist in creating new law where none
existed, it seemed less active in arranging its own
workload. It finished the term with only 75 rulings
- the fewest since the term that ended in 1954, when
there were 65. The Supreme Court itself controls
how many cases it agrees to decide.
But this term, the Supreme Court appeared to
take longer to reach its end. For only the second
time in Rehnquist's decade as chief justice, the
Supreme Court sat beyond the end of June. The only
other time it did that in the past 10 terms was in
1989, when it had a total of 133 decisions.
Typically, the Supreme Court holds its most
significant cases until the final weeks. This year,
more than two-thirds of the major rulings were
issued in the final six weeks.
Among the justices, there have been private
discussions about the declining workload, which has
fallen steadily since 1986, with some justices
wanting to hear more. Others fear that a resumption
of growth in the docket could not be held in check.
Already, the number of cases it has agreed to
consider next term has gone up from a year ago.
When the Supreme Court reassembles on Oct.
7, it could gain a higher visibility a month before the
election because its docket already contains echoes
of politically sensitive issues, including a case that
will be a reminder of Clinton's legal problems from
his pre-presidential past: the Paula Jones sexual
misconduct lawsuit.
Just as presidential candidates will be debating
one of the core issues that divide them - abortion -
the Supreme Court will be confronting that issue
anew. It has promised to review a case testing
further the rights of clinic blockaders to try to get
their anti-abortion message to patients and doctors.
It also will be preparing to rule on the authority
of states to make English the official language of
government operations, and on Congress' power to
control handguns - two more volatile issues with
political repercussions.
The Supreme Court may decide in the new term
to take up other heated constitutional issues: the
rights of terminally ill people to "assisted suicide,"
and the right of gay people to serve in the U. S.
military.
(The writer covers the U. S. Supreme Court for the
Baltimore Sun.)
Copyright 1996 The Baltimore Sun
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TO SCALIA'S DISMAY, THE "REAGAN-BUSH" COURT PROVES
TO BE FEISTILY INDEPENDENT
The News Tribune, Tacoma, WA
Sunday, July 7, 1996
Aaron Epstein
WASHINGTON - Gay Rights Upheld. Women
Break All-Male Barricades. Free Speech Rights
Extended -Is this the Rehnquist Court that liberals
feared, the court on which six of the nine justices are
appointees of presidents Reagan and Bush?
It is a question that Justice Antonin Scalia, the
sharp-witted right-wing intellectual, must have
asked himself repeatedly as he completed his first
decade on the nation's highest court.
He expressed astonishment when his colleagues
scuttled Colorado's constitutional amendment
barring gay-rights laws, ended the historic exclusion
of women at all-male military colleges and protected
government contractors from retaliation for their
political views.
Fuming and scolding more stridently than ever,
Scalia accused his colleagues of betraying American
traditions that deplored homosexuality, believed
military schools were only for boys and thought it
natural for politicians to reward their friends and
punish their enemies.
"The people should not be deceived," he wrote
in Cassandra tones shortly before the term ended
Monday. "While the present court sits, a major,
undemocratic restructuring of our national
institutions and mores is constantly in progress....
Day by day, case by case, it is busy designing a
Constitution for a country I do not recognize."
Scalia's unleashed fury, though exaggerated, is
an accurate measure of the current court's strong
commitment to free speech and association, and its
conviction that "equal protection of the laws"
protects people against laws or government policies
based on irrational prejudice or obsolete
stereotypes.
But the court majority's view of equal
protection is a strict one, cutting across ideological
lines and often producing results that please
conservatives.
The court's concept of equality casts doubt on
government benefits based on race or gender, such
as affrmative action and minority-dominated voting
districts. In most areas of the law, in fact, the
present court remains a conservative-to-moderate
institution.
In their just-completed term, the justices again
exhibited a distaste for race-based government
policies, handed major victories to business, helped
the states at the expense of Congress, limited
prisoners' access to federal courts and resumed a
longtime trend of favoring police and prosecutors.
And because the justices are narrowly split over
such volatile issues as race, religion, abortion, states'
rights and regulation of sexually offensive materials,
the Supreme Court could become an issue in the
1996 presidential race.
One or more vacancies are likely to occur
between 1997 and 2001 (conservative Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, 71, and liberal Justice John
Paul Stevens, 76, are considered most likely to
depart), and some activist organizations already are
urging voters to think about whether those openings
should be filled by Bill Clinton or Bob Dole.
"A new justice or two could tip the ideological
balance," noted Elliot Mincberg, legal director of the
People for the American Way, a liberal group.
Pat Robertson, president of the conservative
Christian Coalition, recently said putting
conservatives on the court "could indeed reverse Roe
v. Wade (the 1973 abortion rights landmark)" and
perhaps "allow prayer in the public schools."
The court as a campaign issue may be of
particular importance to civil rights groups. They
have been major losers in recent Supreme Court
cases.
A year ago the justices jeopardized election
districts drawn to create black or Hispanic
majorities, restricted federal affirmative action
programs and limited remedies for school
segregation. This year they struck down
minority-dominated congressional districts in Texas
and North Carolina, made it difficult for blacks to
prove they were singled out for criminal
prosecutions and rejected pleas that the 1990 census
be adjusted upward to make up for the government's
admitted undercounting of minorities.
Minority activists were especially incensed by
the ruling on racial gerrymandering, and wondered
whether any predominantly minority voting districts
could pass muster at today's Supreme Court.
However, some groups generally opposed to
government use of racial criteria also began to worry
about the court's voting rights decisions.
The danger, warned the American Jewish
Congress, is that "the nation will retreat into an era
when minorities were not seen in the nation's
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legislative bodies" and that minorities will see the
rulings "as a sign that they are not welcome in the
political process."
But if civil rights groups were gloomy, business
(especially banks and thrifts) had cause to celebrate
a banner year at the high court.
The court allowed greater free speech in the
business world, invalidating state laws that banned
liquor price advertising. It was a ruling that some
observers thought could spell legal trouble for the
Clinton administration's proposed crackdown on
cigarette ads aimed at children.
And for the first time, the court found a state
punitive damage award to be unconstitutionally
excessive.
An Alabama doctor unhappy with the
undisclosed repainting job on his new $40,000
BMW sedan did not deserve a $2 million punitive
award that was 500 times the value of the actual
damages, the court said.
But it appeared doubtful that the impact of the
decision in that unusual case would extend to
punitive damages awarded to people who were
seriously injured by a defective product.
The court allowed banks to sell insurance in
small towns despite contrary state laws and
permitted banks to collect various fees from
credit-card holders even if the consumer's home
state forbids it.
And about 100 savings and loan firms hit the
jackpot when the justices found the federal
government liable for breach-of-contract damages
that could pay the thrifts billions of taxpayer dollars
in damages.
Consumers won a victory, though, when the
court allowed state personal-injury suits against
manufacturers of allegedly defective medical
devices, such as heart pacemakers and silicon breast
implants. Consumer advocates said the decision also
would help people hurt by pesticides, automobile air
bags and a host of other regulated products.
The controversial use of property forfeitures to
enforce the criminal laws produced two surprises of
the term.
First, the court bolstered the government's
power to seize property linked to a crime - even
though one of the property's owners was blameless.
Tina Bennis, a Michigan mother of five, lost a
family car after her husband used the front seat to
engage in oral sex with a prostitute in a vice-infested
neighborhood of Detroit.
Then the court endorsed a major weapon in the
war on drugs. It allowed the government to
prosecute individuals for crimes - and also seize
their homes, bank accounts or other crime-related
property. That law-enforcement strategy did not
place defendants in double jeopardy, the justices
said.
"Observers of earlier cases thought the court
was going to circumscribe the promiscuous use of
forfeitures," said Laurence Tribe, a liberal professor
at Harvard Law School. "But the decisions this term
suggest an almost instinctive tendency to rule for
law enforcement."
The court also upheld the military death penalty,
allowed police officers to make traffic stops as a
pretext to look for drugs or other evidence, and
permitted states to bar criminal defendants from
using their drunkenness as evidence that they did not
act deliberately.
During the 1995-96 term, the Supreme Court
justices wrote signed opinions in only 82 disputes,
the lowest amount in more than 30 years and far
below the 140-per-year average of the 1980s.
On most days, the court's business was so dull
that a case about railroad coupling sounded sexy (a
railroad is not liable for injuries suffered by a
railroad worker trying to straighten a misaligned
drawbar) - and even the justices began to apologize.
One Monday in June, Clarence Thomas
announced three cases. At the end of the first one,
about taxes and the Export Clause, he looked down
at the bored audience and said sarcastically: "I know
that was scintillating."
Swiftly, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed:
"Wait 'til you hear the next one."
But the term set to begin on the first Monday in
October is shaping up as a more productive and
newsworthy one.
The court plans to tackle issues involving cable
television, abortion protests, English as an official
language, sexual predator laws, federal gun control
- and, perhaps, doctor-assisted suicide and
indecency on the Internet.
(Aaron Epstein covers the Supreme Court for the
Washington Bureau of Knight-Ridder Newspapers.)
Copyright 1996 Knight-Ridder Tribune
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HIGH COURT'S JUSTICE WITH A CAUSE
Bench Position Amplifies Ginsburg's Lifelong Feminist Message
The Washington Post
Monday, April 17, 1995
Joan Biskupic
In her 20 months on the Supreme Court, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg's frank and revealingly
personal accounts of the obstacles facing women
have established her as one of the nation's most
prominent feminist voices.
Not since the appointment of Thurgood
Marshall has a justice been so identified with a
cause as Ginsburg. But while Marshall, once he
joined the court, expressed his commitment to civil
rights privately or through his written opinions,
Ginsburg has taken her advocacy of women's rights
public in a way that is unusual for a member of the
court, speaking on college campuses, to women's
groups and at occasions honoring other female
officials.
Appearing at Columbia Law School a few
months after her appointment, Ginsburg evoked
what is by now a familiar response.
"If it's possible to have love at first sight with
someone you don't know," a young woman told
Ginsburg, to loud applause from the predominantly
female audience, "I'm feeling a little bit of that with
you now."
Yet, little of the passion that inspired such
enthusiasm at Columbia has been evident in her
record on the court. Since President Clinton
appointed her in 1993, her opinions have been
consistent with the middle-of-the-road approach that
characterized her tenure as a judge on the court of
appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Last
term, in fact, she sided more often with
conservative Antonin Scalia than with Harry A.
Blackmun, the court's most consistent liberal until
his retirement.
Moreover, while Ginsburg is clearly energized
by her public role, she remains shy and awkward in
one-on-one conversations, often avoiding direct eye
contact. She also is unusually prickly about public
and press scrutiny. She declined to be interviewed or
photographed for this story.
And despite her calls for sexual equality and
frequent references on the bench to gender -- she has
made a point during oral arguments, for example, of
referring to hypothetical judges as "she" --
Ginsburg rejects the notion women bring a different
approach, or "voice," to the court.
Ginsburg's views are rooted in personal
experience as a working mother and as a victim of
discrimination -- discrimination, she has not been
reluctant to declare, that continues today.
. Women will. not be truly liberated, she says,
until men take equal care of children: "If I had an
affirmative action program to design," she said at
one Brooklyn appearance, "it would be to give men
every incentive to be concerned about the rearing of
children."
In a California appearance last fall, she recalled
her distress at being phoned regularly by her
then-young son's school principal, who wanted to
discuss his behavior. "This child has two parents,"
Ginsburg told the principal. "Please alternate calls
for conferences."
And as for her widely reported tendency to
interrupt her colleagues during oral arguments,
including Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in one
particular incident, Ginsburg told Diane Sawyer in
an unusual television appearance on ABC's
"PrimeTime Live": "Diane, that never would have
been noticed if it were two guys."
SHARING THE SPOTLIGHT
"I can't think of any justice who is like Ginsburg
in using the court as a bully pulpit," said University
of Minnesota law professor Suzanna Sherry.
"Given that she had to fight the fight, she now
doesn't want to stand in anyone's shadow," added
Columbia University law professor Vivian Berger.
Ginsburg's use of her position for a feminist
message began the June day in 1993 when Clinton
presented her in the Rose Garden and she paid
tribute to her mother: "I pray that I may be all that
she would have been had she lived in an age when
women could aspire and achieve, and daughters are
cherished as much as sons."
Many women in the audience had tears in their
eyes. And the reaction to her more recent
appearances has been just as fervent.
Georgetown University law professor Chai
Feldblum said she was enthralled by Ginsburg at a
Harvard event celebrating female graduates last
year: It "was moving at times in its rendition of the
challenges women have faced.. .. The integrity was
palpable."
Ginsburg's outspokenness presents a sharp
contrast to O'Connor, who made history in 1981 by
becoming the first woman appointed to the court.
O'Connor has her own personal experiences to draw
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on -- she was offered a secretarial job when she
graduated from Stanford University law school in
1952 - but she does not dwell on societal inequities
the way Ginsburg does. The differences may be of
style, degrees of activism or even roots.
O'Connor, 65, was born into a land-owning
family. She became an Arizona state senator and
judge and bested the system from within. Ginsburg,
62, was born in Brooklyn to a family of modest
means and fought sexism from the outside.
When she graduated from Columbia Law
School in 1959, Ginsburg said, "I struck out on
three grounds -- I was Jewish, a woman, and a
mother. The first raised one eyebrow; the second,
two; the third made me indubitably inadmissible."
Ginsburg is also bolder in pointing a finger at
the failings of men who "remain reluctant to share
the joys and burdens of bringing up children."
"One truth must be told," she said last year in a
New York appearance, "motherly love ain't
everything it has been cracked up to be. To some
extent, it's a myth that men have created to make
women think that they do this job to perfection."
Ginsburg said she believes that as many children are
battered by women as by men.
'SOCIAL JUSTICE' ADVOCATE
The message of sexual equality is not new for
an advocate who argued six cases before the
Supreme Court and won new legal protection from
sex discrimination. The opportunities to spread it
are.
"My guess about Ruth is that she had her eye on
this job for a while," said Kathleen Peratis Frank, a
former colleague at the ACLU Women's Rights
Project, "and she has now become the advocate for
social justice in all corners of her life."
In the past, justices have struggled with how
much they should expose themselves to the public,
or interact with officials from other branches of
government, or even voice strong opinions unrelated
to cases.
"The speeches the justices give, particularly to
educated opinion leaders, are invaluable as public
education," said political science professor Gayle
Binion of the University of California, Santa
Barbara. "Some justices don't like to do it because
they are concerned about expressing personal
views."
Mark V. Tushnet, a Marshall biographer and
Georgetown law professor, said Marshall "didn't
give speeches. Until the very end of his career, he
didn't appear on TV. He didn't think that it was
appropriate. He was a judge."
"But judges make their own decisions about
that," Tushnet continued, and "the public persona of
the justice contributes to the impact of that justice's
work."
Most of the justices today attend legal
conferences, making interesting but unprovocative
remarks about court activities. Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist often works his great interest in
history into his comments. Similarly, Scalia and
Stephen G. Breyer are passionate about the fairly
arcane topic of legislative history and will make it a
focus from their opposing points of view.
- - Ginsburg is alone in her call to arms on social
policy. But her fervor is rarely expressed in her
opinions -- on equal rights or any other issue.
Ginsburg's decisions stick close to the facts of a
case and she avoids broad pronouncements of law.
Her style is efficient and bland.
Since Ginsburg became a justice, the court has
reviewed six cases especially important to women.
In only one of those cases did Ginsburg write a
separate statement.
When Ginsburg did assert herself, in a case
involving sexual harassment, she appeared to try to
lay the groundwork for the court to find that the
Constitution guarantees equality between the sexes
as strongly as it does racial equality.
The full court ruled that a worker who claims
she was sexually harassed need not prove she was
psychologically injured to win money damages. In a
concurring opinion, Ginsburg wrote that "the critical
issue is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment
to which members of the other sex are not exposed."
Then, in a footnote that got special attention
from lawyers, she wrote that the court has left open
whether government classifications that put one sex
at an advantage over another should be as closely
scrutinized as racial classifications. If this higher
standard were adopted, it would become the
government's burden to prove the fairness of a
classification that gives one sex an advantage -- a
difficult burden to meet.
That was "a very rousing start" said University
of Chicago law professor Cass Sunstein, for
someone "who is not an adventurous justice."
Before she became a judge in 1980, Ginsburg
had devoted her professional life to trying to win
that tough standard for sex discrimination. Not only
did she represent men and women who had been
victims of bias, but she wrote numerous articles that
she hoped would convince the legal community of
her position.
Whether Ginsburg makes inroads over time
depends on what cases come to the court and the
membership of the bench. Her belief in the breadth
of the guarantee of equal protection of the laws
could end up influencing the court when it considers
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the constitutionality of all-male schools, such as
Virginia Military Institute, or more broadly,
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Some scholars have suggested that women
bring a distinct perspective tojudicial roles, not just
in opinions, but in their overall public persona.
Sherry has written that there is a "feminine"
approach to judging, for example, that offers more
flexibility in solving problems.
To O'Connor, the idea of a female difference
raises problems."'This so-called new feminism is -
interesting but troubling," O'Connor said recently,
suggesting that such arguments recall the days when
people thought female judges were more suited to
handle child custody cases and not up to tough,
criminal law jobs.
Ginsburg appears to agree. "Theoretical
discussions are ongoing today -- particularly in
academic circles -- about differences in the voices
women and men hear, or in their moral
perceptions," she said last fall. "When asked about
such things, I usually abstain. Generalizations about
the way women or men are -- my life's experience
bears out -- cannot guide me reliably in making
decisions about particular individuals."
Her husband, Martin D. Ginsburg, wrote in a
letter to The Washington Post that his wife does not
think women speak in a different "voice." "I am sure
she believes quite the opposite," he said.
Martin Ginsburg, a tax attorney and
Georgetown law professor, often serves as a
spokesman for his wife, as well as playing the role
of "campaign manager for life," as friend and
Georgetown colleague Susan Low Bloch described
it.
CRITICAL OF COURT COVERAGE
Despite -- or perhaps because of -- such image
consciousness, Ginsburg has been publicly critical
of court coverage. In an appearance before the
American Bar Foundation in February, she said
reporters often exaggerate justices' orders and too
often look for the practical effects of rulings. She
said she was preparing a research paper on the
coverage and told a reporter, "Some of your
colleagues won't appreciate the footnotes" referring
to their individual stories.
Such meticulousness is nothing new. As an
appeals court judge, Ginsburg was known for
treating most of her clerks with great warmth but a
handful of others with contempt, presumably
because they were not up to her standards.
While Ginsburg is respected among her
colleagues, her-fussiness has mildly offended some
of them, according to law clerks who worked at the
court during her first term. She focuses on
misspellings, omissions of case law and other small
details in their draft opinions. Last term, when
Blackmun began writing an opinion concerning sex
discrimination, Ginsburg responded in a memo
circulated to justices that he had overlooked some
prior cases relevant to the situation. Such particulars
are usually left to law clerks.
Ginsburg's rigidity with people and the law may
undermine her ultimate influence on the court, say
some scholars. Her rulings on the appeals court
rarely drew the special attention in the legal
community that the writings of some high-profile
appeals judges garner.
Yet Ginsburg is smart, shrewd and persistent.
People close to her say she never does anything
without thinking it through and that she can quietly
take on projects that do not bear fruit for several
years.
Whether Ginsburg, who is using the force of her
life to inspire people off the court, will be able to
inspire her colleagues remains an open question.
"I feel pretty good when I'm the fifth vote to
decide the case," she told a group in Brooklyn last
year. "I feel even better if I'm the fourth and I pick
up a fifth vote based on the writing."
Staff researcher Ann O'Hanlon contributed to this
report.
The Washington Post Copyright 1995
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JUSTICE KENNEDY'S INFLUENCE
Ex Corporate Lawyer Is High Court's Key Vote on Wide Range of Issues
Rocky Mountain News
May 27, 1996, Monday
Linda Greenhouse, The New York Times
WASHINGTON: When a lawyer for Colorado
began his Supreme Court argument defending a
state constitutional provision that bans
anti-discrimination laws for homosexuals, he was
interrupted almost immediately by a justice who was
clearly troubled by the state's position.
"Pve never seen a case like this," the justice said.
"Is there any precedent that you can cite to the court
where we've upheld a law such as this?"
The lawyer never quite regained his stride, and
the justice who asked that question Oct. 10,
Anthony M. Kennedy, went on to write the forceful
opinion for a 6-3 majority that last week struck
down Colorado's Amendment 2 as a violation of the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Declaring that a state may not "deem a class of
persons a stranger to its laws," Kennedy said, "It is
not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws
of this sort."
The decision in Romer vs. Evans underscored
the crucial - and in some respects ambiguous - role
its author has come to play since he arrived at the
court in early 1988 to fill the seat the Reagan
administration had intended for Robert Bork.
On a sharply polarized court, Kennedy's is most
often the pivotal vote. Last term he voted with the
majority in 5-4 cases more than any otherjustice: 13
times in 16 cases. During the term before that, he
was never in dissent in the 14 cases decided by 5-4
votes.
That means Kennedy's responses have become
the court's responses and his view has become law,
across a remarkable range of issues:
* Cases involving race, in which he has
consistently voted to strike down affirmative action
and race-conscious redistricting.
* Abortion, where he wrote part of an unusual
joint opinion four years ago that reaffirmed Roe vs.
Wade.
* Free speech, where he joined a 5-4 opinion in
1989 holding that the First Amendment protects
burning an American flag as a political protest
A year ago, Kennedy cast the deciding votes in
two important federalism cases, one on each side of
the federal-state divide.
He first joined one bloc of four justices to place
a limit, for the first time in 60 years, on Congress'
assertion of authority over interstate commerce, and
then joined the other four justices in rejecting
state-imposed term limits for members of Congress.
This justice - who could fairly be said, through
force of circumstance, to hold the modem course of
constitutional law in his hands - is a most unlikely
field marshal in the "culture wars" Justice Antonin
Scalia referred to in his dissent in the Colorado case.
Fifty-nine years old, a one-time corporate
lawyer and lobbyist on business issues before the
California state legislature, Kennedy is conservative
in style and outlook.
He has core beliefs, notably among them that it
is constitutionally wrong for the government to
classify people, by race or any other characteristic,
a view that helps explain the apparent anomaly of
his "conservative" votes in affirmative action cases
and his "liberal" view in the Colorado case.
His dislike of state policies that classify people
by group faces another test this term when the court
decides whether Virginia may exclude women from
the state-supported Virginia Military Institute.
He also has as protective a view of free speech
as any member of the court.
"He doesn't have an agenda," David M. O'Brien,
a Supreme Court scholar at the University of
Virginia, said last week. "That's why he's hard to
peg. He does try to arrive at a principled, rather than
a compromise or pragmatic, position - and that can
make him rather politically incorrect."
The stakes could not have been higher when
Kennedy arrived in Washington after 12 years on
the federal appeals court in California.
The administration's first choice for the seat,
Bork, had gone down to bitter defeat after a titanic,
months-long confirmation battle.
From the very first, conservatives mistrusted
Kennedy because he was not Bork, one of the
judicial right wing's leading theorists and
polemicists, and liberals feared that he was simply
"Bork without the bite," in the phrase of the time.
As it became clear how unlike Bork he was,
Kennedy was subject to intense, often-belittling
16
criticism from conservatives. In an op-ed article in
The New York Times days after the 1992 abortion
decision, Bork himself said sarcastically that the
joint opinion was "intensely popular" with the
media, law school faculties and "at least 90% of the
people justices may meet at Washington dinner
parties."
Respect has come slowly and grudgingly, but it
is coming. "In a very thoughtful and principled way,
Kennedy is quietly constructing a libertarian
jurisprudence on the court," said Clint Bolick, vice
president of the Institute for Justice, a conservative
think tank and law firm here. He said Kennedy's
skepticism of government explains many of his
votes, on issues as diverse as abortion, property
rights, the First Amendment and federalism.
While conservatives would not always be happy
with Kennedy, Bolick said, "This is emphatically not
a squishy moderate."
To some liberals, the Colorado case showed that
Kennedy's vote in the 1992 abortion case was no
anomaly. "When it's really mattered, he has stepped
up to bat, stood up to Scalia, and voted to preserve
and protect human dignity," said Peter J. Rubin, a
lawyer who clerked on the court in the early 1990s.
Laurence Tribe, a professor at Harvard law
school who drew the ire of many fellow liberals
when he testified in support of Kennedy's
nomination, has watched him closely. "He's stuck to
his guns, whether they point right or left," Tribe
said, adding that he sometimes stops to think "how
dramatically different the constitutional history of
the country has been" with Kennedy rather than
Bork on the court.
Copyright 1996 The New York Times
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TAKING STATES SERIOUSLY
The New York Times
April 14, 1996
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON: For much of his nearly quarter
century on the Supreme Court, William H.
Rehnquist was the outrider. Often in dissent, he
traveled far from the pack, tracing a singular path
across a constitutional landscape that in his view
was strewn with monuments to the modem Court's
errors. Prominent among these were the Court's
precedents elevating the power of the Federal
Government at the expense of the individual states.
Now approaching his 10th anniversary as Chief
Justice, Mr. Rehnquist began to put his years as a
lone dissenter behind as Presidents Reagan and
Bush reshaped the Court around him. These days,
he is the general in charge of a constitutional war
along the Federal-state frontier. Aided by timing,
patience and, to no small extent, the good luck of
having colleagues who agree with him that the
states' interests have been submerged for too long,
he is conducting this high-stakes war along several
fronts of distinct but interrelated constitutional
doctrine.
And he is winning. When the Rehnquist Court
passes into history -- the 71-year-old Chief Justice
is widely expected to retire within the next few years
-- a reshaping of the Federal-state balance may
prove his most enduring legacy. He has been
frustrated in other areas where he lacks a working
majority - the right to abortion is still the law of the
land, and organized prayer is not back in public
schools. But for Federal-state relations, his tenure
could mark a historic shift.
STATES' RIGHTS
Last month, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote an
opinion for a 5-to-4 majority in a case that gave new
teeth to one of the Constitution's more obscure and
ambiguous provisions, the 11th Amendment. The
amendment, adopted in 1795 in response to the
states' fears of being sued for Revolutionary War
debts, shields a state from being sued in Federal
court by a citizen of another state. The Court
subsequently interpreted the I1th Amendment to
bar suits by a state's own citizens as well in an
1890 decision that Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
last week in Seminole Tribe v. Florida essentially
revised and placed on firmer constitutional footing
than ever before.
The Seminole Tribe decision struck down a
portion of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, a
Federal law governing the terms by which Indian
tribes can conduct gambling on their reservations.
The Court held that, despite Congress's virtually
complete constitutional authority to legislate in the
area of Indian affairs and the states' lack of any such
authority, the law's provision permitting tribes to
sue a state to bring it to the bargaining table violated
the 11th Amendment.
The decision contained several loopholes;
people can still sue states on equal protection
grounds and seek injunctions to keep individual
state officials from violating Federal law. But it calls
into question the authority of Congress to insure that
people can vindicate their Federally guaranteed
rights in Federal court.
The I Ith Amendment case followed by less
than a year an important victory by the Chief Justice
on another front: Congress's authority to regulate
interstate commerce. In United States v. Lopez, the
Court found for the first time in 60 years that
Congress had exceeded its authority by making it a
Federal crime to carry a gun within 1,000 feet of a
school. Such an act, the Chief Justice said, was
simply not commerce.
As with the Seminole Tribe case, the
significance of United States v. Lopez lay in its
implications, in its turning away from the prevailing
notion that Congress knew best and that the
authentic vision of American history was "the steady
and inevitable triumph of nationalism," as Wilfred
M. McClay, a historian at Tulane University, wrote
recently in Commentary.
A Rehnquist opinion rings no such rhetorical
bells. The Lopez opinion was typically dry and to
the point. To agree with the Government that
Congress had the power it claimed would require the
Court to conclude "that there never will be a
distinction between what is truly national and what
is truly local," the Chief Justice said. "This," he
added, "we are unwilling to do."
Federal courts have since struck down a Federal
arson law as applied to a private home -- seen as
insufficiently connected to interstate commerce --
and the Child Support Recovery Act, which brings
some "deadbeat dad" cases within Federal
jurisdiction.
The mightiest constitutional engine of all for
returning power to the states may be the 10th
Amendment, which has been absent from the
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Court's docket for the last few years but may soon
return in force.
The 10th Amendment provides that powers not
delegated by the Constitution to the Federal
Government are reserved to the states. Its history as
a charter of state sovereignty has been fitful, with
the Chief Justice its most ardent modern champion
on the Court.
Four years ago, he joined an opinion by Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor that invoked the 10th
Amendment to strike down a Federal law that
required the states to take responsibility for
disposing of the low-level radioactive waste
generated within their borders. Referring to the
Constitution as dividing power "among sovereigns,"
Justice O'Connor said the Federal Government
could not "commandeer" the states "into the service
of Federal regulatory purposes."
TICKING DECISIONS
For several years, the decision, New York v.
United States, sat quietly ticking. But last month,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit relied heavily on it to strike down a section
of the 1994 Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act
that requires local sheriffs to make background
checks of handgun purchasers. The Brady law
makes states the "victims of impermissible Federal
coercion," the appeals court said. Two other appeals
courts had upheld the law, so Supreme Court review
is all but inevitable.
In addition to Justice O'Connor, a former state
legislator and judge in Arizona who came to the
Court as a passionate advocate for state interests,
the Chief Justice's allies are Justices Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas. (It is
an interesting twist that the only other Justice with
state government experience, David H. Souter, a
- former New Hampshire attorney general and state
court judge, has brought equal passion to dissenting
opinions that have made the argument for Federal
authority.)
While solid for now, the Chief Justice's margin
is thin enough to make it likely that hearings for his
successor -- or for any Justice -- will spend
substantial time on the nominee's views on
federalism. After years of controversy over race,
sex, religion and abortion, who could have predicted
that the 10th Amendment, the 11th Amendment and
the Commerce Clause would hold center stage? But
if the confirmation process is a window into what
people hope for and fear from the Court at any given
moment, they just might.
Copyright 1996 The New York Times Company
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THOMAS CAUGHT UP IN CONFLICT
Jurist's Court Rulings, Life Experience Are At Odds, Many Blacks Say
The Washington Post
Friday, June 7, 1996
Joan Biskupic
What is it about Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas that provokes such profound
ambivalence, and often animosity, among African
Americans?
The answer lies in the contrast between
Thomas's personal experience as a victim of
discrimination in the deep South and his current
rejection of traditional remedies for such bias. He is
a powerful symbol of black achievement who
declares that one important avenue for minority
achievement -- affirmative action -- is "poisonous
and pernicious."
He has incited conflict from the moment
President George Bush nominated him in 1991. The
NAACP, the nation's oldest and largest civil rights
group, struggled for weeks over Thomas's
nomination and in the end opposed the man who
would be the court's second black justice. Similar
conflict is evident today in majority-black Prince
George's County, Md., where school officials first
invited the justice to speak, disinvited him, then
awkwardly invited him again.
The debate among blacks over whether Thomas
should be revered or reviled is compounded by
larger America's struggle with how to give past
victims of discrimination their due without
exacerbating bias based on skin color.
"He provokes a really visceral reaction," said
Yale University law professor Stephen L. Carter,
who is black. "The Supreme Court had been the
ultimate place that black people had been able to go
to vindicate their rights.. .. That is not the case
anymore, and that the most prominent conservative
voice on the court is a black hurts people."
Carter, who has written about the successes and
failures of affirmative action, said yesterday, "My
own view is that I think Thomas is wrong about an
awful lot of stuff, but that doesn't mean he's a
traitor."
Barbara Arnwine, executive director of the
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law,
thinks it does. While she acknowledged that many
blacks are pleased to see a black person ascend to
the highest court, she is with those who "see all
these accomplishments and also see him slamming
the door on others... . He is an anti-role model."
Last year, when Thomas voted against
affirmative action, he said programs entitled to
benefit blacks and Hispanics are "just as noxious as
discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice." He
believes race-based remedies for discrimination
violate the constitutional principle of equal
protection of the laws and that it is not up to
government to create equality. "Government cannot
make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and
protect us as equal before the law," he said.
"So-called 'benign' discrimination teaches many
that because of chronic and apparently immutable
handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them
without their patronizing indulgence," Thomas
wrote in a concurring statement in Adarand v. Pena,
a case that limited federal affirmative action
programs. "Inevitably, such programs engender
attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke
resentment among those who believe that they have
been wronged by the government's use of race.
These programs stamp minorities with a badge of
inferiority and may cause them to develop
dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are
'entitled' to preferences."
Thomas has taken a similar approach in
rejecting remedial efforts for the vestiges of school
segregation. When he voted against a Kansas City
school desegregation plan last year, he criticized a
lower court judge for accepting "the theory that
black students suffer an unspecified psychological
harm from segregation that retards their mental and
educational development."
"This approach ... relies upon questionable
social science research rather than constitutional
principle," Thomas said.
He also has voted to strike down legislative
redistricting plans intended to ensure political
representation by minorities by creating districts in
which they were a majority of the voters. In the
1994 case Holder v. Hall, he said, "As a practical
political matter, our drive to segregate political
districts by race can only serve to deepen racial
divisions by destroying any need for voters or
candidates to build bridges between racial groups or
to form voting coalitions."
As some blacks see it, Thomas benefited from
affirmative action policies only to turn his back on
them. During his 1991 confirmation, Yale
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University officials said Thomas was admitted to
the law school in 1971 through a program that
sought 10 percent minority enrollment. In a 1983
speech Thomas gave at the federal Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission, he praised
affirmative action policies as critical to the
advancement of minorities and women.
"But for them, God only knows where I would
be today," said Thomas, who was EEOC chairman
from 1982 to 1990. "These laws and their proper
application are all that stand between the first 17
years of my life and the second 17."
Last month, he told a Texas audience that
affirmative action policies did not exist when he was
in college.
"When I went to Yale Law School, they had
reduced black admissions from 40 to 12. We were
all there on our own merit. In subsequent years,
that's a fact that's been clouded," he said, according
to a Dallas Morning News account of the speech.
Retired federal appellate Judge A. Leon
Higginbotham Jr., who was one of the first blacks to
become a federal appeals judge and who is a vocal
Thomas critic, said in a speech to the American Bar
Association last year:
"Since by his own admission he was the
beneficiary of affirmative action programs, what
does his conscience say when he rejects affirmative
action programs that would give to future
generations the same type of opportunities he
received?"
Higginbotham asserted in the same speech that
Thurgood Marshall, whom Thomas replaced and
who died in 1993, would be dismayed at Thomas's
record.
But law professor Carter, a former law clerk to
Marshall, said Thomas was never going to be able
to fill the shoes of the distinguished civil rights
lawyer and no one should have such expectation.
"Clarence Thomas is neither a hero or a
monster," Carter said in an interview yesterday. "But
many people still will not forgive him for not being
Thurgood Marshall.
"A lot of black Americans took it as a deliberate
slight when Bush nominated Clarence Thomas to
succeed Thurgood Marshall because his views were
the opposite of Marshall's. It was seen as a cynical
act. And there is no way that he could live that
down. The fact of the matter is that there are white
justices as conservative as Thomas: Scalia and
Rehnquist. They don't generate anything like the
kind of animosity that Thomas does."
But Justice Antonin Scalia and Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist never raised expectations
among blacks that they would take a broad view of
civil rights and remedies.
"People had hoped against hope that if nothing
else, his experience and his background would make
him see the light" about the legal needs of racial
minorities, said George E. Curry, editor of Emerge,
a black news magazine that published a story in
1994 about Thomas called "The House Negro."
The Washington Post Copyright 1996
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ONE ANGRY MAN
Even on a Conservative Court, Antonin Scalia Manages To Seem Embattled
Time Magazine
Monday, July 8, 1996
James S. Kunen
King Solomon, in his wisdom, would listen to
the details of each dispute, carefully weigh the
competing interests and then render a decision
perfectly tailored to the circumstances. Great king.
Lousy judge--at least by the lights of Justice
Antonin Scalia.
The term that ends this month marks Scalia's
10th year on the Supreme Court. He has tirelessly
argued that case-by-case, seat-of-the-pants
jurisprudence tums judges into illicit legislators who
substitute their policy preferences for those of the
people's democratically elected officials. Last week,
for example, he refused to join the rest of the court
in holding that the tax-supported, men-only Virginia
Military Institute violated women's right to equal
protection of the laws. A democratic system, Scalia
wrote, "is destroyed if the smug assurances of each
age are removed from the democratic process and
written into the Constitution."
Judges--not all of whom have the wisdom of
Solomon--should apply general, unvarying rules to
every case, Scalia says. And the Constitution, he
maintains, consists of just such rules. Where others
see highly abstract terms, intentionally written to
evolve with the nation they're meant to govern,
Scalia-who describes himself as a textualist and
originalist-sees a text of fixed and narrow meaning:
in the Bill of Rights, "liberty" cannot comprise the
privacy and personal autonomy to choose to have an
abortion or to engage in homosexual relations
because it did not in 1791. The 14th Amendment's
"equal protection" cannot overrule the decision by
the people of a state that a single-sex public college
is a good idea. The Constitution, wrote Scalia,
"takes no sides in this educational debate." Only by
such a literal reading can the Constitution's
protections be preserved, Scalia insists, because if
judges can add rights, they can also take them away.
"The Constitution is not an empty bottle," he tells
his frequent lecture audiences. "It is like a statute,
and the meaning doesn't change."
Along with his philosophy of judicial restraint,
Scalia boasts a resume bursting with brilliance
(valedictorian at Georgetown, a Law Review editor
at Harvard, esteemed law professor at the University
of Chicago) and a reputation for gregariousness and
charm. So in 1986 the Reagan Administration
believed that the 50-year-old circuit court of appeals
judge was the perfect candidate to lead a new
conservative majority on the high court into the 21st
century. That he was an Italian-American father of
nine whose appointment would please an ethnic
constituency was a bonus. At the time, Chicago law
professor Geoffrey Stone predicted in the ABA
Journal that his former associate's collegial spirit
would help build consensus among the Justices:
"He has the personal skills, intelligence, patience
and manner to work out compromises and find
common ground."
It hasn't worked out that way. When fellow
Reagan appointee Anthony Kennedy wrote, for the
6-to-3 majority in Romer v. Evans in May, that a
state constitutional amendment denying legal redress
for discrimination based on homosexuality violated
the equal-protection clause, Scalia wrote a withering
dissent. He scoffed at the majority opinion's "grim,
disapproving hints that Coloradans have been guilty
of animus or animosity toward homosexuality, as
though that has been established as un-American"
and derided Kennedy's reasoning as "preposterous"
and "comical," then dismissed the holding as
"terminal silliness."
Such insulting language has become Scalia's
signature style. It does not win friends or influence
jurists--except perhaps to move them off the fence
into alignment against him. Georgetown University
law professor Mark Tushnet, who has studied the
personal papers of the late Justice Thurgood
Marshall, says Scalia "annoyed everybody at one
time or another ... They'd get over it and say,
That's just how Nino is,' and then he'd do something
else. It has to have left some residue of
unwillingness to accommodate him."
In fact, a decade of exertions has not won a
single Justice to Scalia's originalist point of view;
his only dependable ally is Clarence Thomas, who
shared his philosophy in the first place. On the
nine-seat court, Scalia is one of seven Justices
chosen by Republican Presidents. Yet "he has this
view of himself as embattled," observes Yale law
professor Robert Burt, "always fighting the
desperate fight."
Scalia's siege mentality was manifest in his
speech this spring at a Mississippi prayer breakfast.
"We are fools for Christ's sake . .. We must pray for
the courage to endure the scorn of the sophisticated
world," he declared, explaining that in educated
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circles Christians are regarded as "simpleminded."
The speech echoed one he gave last year at
Princeton University, where he maintained that his
views on the proper role of judges were regarded as
"simpleminded" in "sophisticated circles."
Despite his self-image as a member of a
beleaguered group, Scalia, as a matter of judicial
principle, consistently leaves minorities, including
religious minorities, at the mercy of majority rule.
Only when the majority's duly passed laws
contravene an explicit provision of the Constitution
does Scalia believe he must step in--sometimes
against his own political preferences: he cast the
fifth vote to overturn laws prohibiting flag burning
because they violated freedom of speech ("A result
that I'm quite sure in his heart of hearts he hated,"
says Chicago's Stone).
In the absence of a clear constitutional
imperative, however, he is willing to grant broad
powers to the majority and demonstrates, as George
Kannar, a law professor who has written extensively
on Scalia, has noted, "an affection for established
norms, and for 'normalcy' in general, extending to
the most private part of private life." Therefore it
was not surprising when, dissenting from the court's
holding last month that psychotherapists should
have a privilege against disclosing their clients'
confidences in court proceedings, Scalia wrote, "Ask
the average citizen: Would your mental health be
more significantly impaired by preventing you from
seeing a psychotherapist, or by preventing you from
getting advice from your mom? I have little doubt
what the answer would be. Yet there is no
mother-child privilege."
On the highly contentious issue of affirmative
action, however, Scalia has been accused of
abandoning both his fidelity to original intent and
his habitual deference to the legislature. He argues
that the 14th Amendments equal-protection clause
forbids virtually any racial classifications in law
despite the fact that the very Congress that passed
the 14th Amendment went on to pass laws using just
such classifications.
Scalia's objections to set asides and preferential
treatment run deep. "My father came to this country
when he was a teenager," he once wrote. "Not only
had he never profited from the sweat of any black
man's brow, I don't think he had ever seen a black
man." The only child of an Italian-immigrant father
who became a professor of Romance languages at
Brooklyn College and of an Italian-American
mother who taught public school, Scalia remains
determinedly anti-elitist--he dines in a downtown
pizza joint and keeps his name listed in the phone
book. He can be a forceful advocate for those
working-class white males he described in one
gender-based case as affirmative action's
"losers . . unknown, unaffluent, unorganized."
But to other "losers" in life, the poor, Scalia
appears less sympathetic, consistently voting against
claimants to government aid. Because welfare comes
without the efforts at moral uplift that accompanied
religious charity, he told an audience in May, "the
result is often the elimination of poverty without the
elimination of the vices that produce the poverty."
Though he sometimes sounds like a champion
of the status quo, with all its inequities, Scalia
points out that it is not the court's job to decide what
is right, only what is constitutional. When his fellow
Justices cast themselves as moral arbiters, as he
insisted they did in the V.M.I. case, their enterprise,
he wrote, "is not the interpretation of a Constitution,
but the creation of one." The one we have suits
Scalia just fine.
Quote: "This most illiberal court ... has embarked
on a course of inscribing one after another of the
current preferences of the society .. . into our Basic
Law." -Scalia on single-sex education
(With reporting by Viveca Novak/Washington)
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